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Abstract 
 
In recent years, the problematic relationship between conflicts of interest and corruption 
has been a sensitive one to democracy. Although conflicts of interest have not always resulted in 
corruption, they do constitute an important opportunity structure for such illicit behaviour.  
The Portuguese attempt at regulating conflicts of interest in parliament has been 
paradigmatic: eight legislative interventions to the first Statute of MPs in less than two decades 
and parliament was still unable to create an appropriate ethical framework to prevent financial 
impropriety deriving from the accumulation of the representative mandate with other outside jobs 
and activities. The incremental nature of adjustments, the peculiar “tailor made” nature of 
legislation and the importation of regulatory models “in place” abroad, raise important aspects in 
regard both to the scope and efficacy of the instruments adopted as well as the legislators’ 
intentions and willingness to move on with the necessary reforms. 
This paper attempts to assess the regulatory performance and reform efforts of the 
Portuguese Assembleia da República in addressing MPs’ conflicts of interest through the analysis 
of the control framework adopted, namely, rules of disclosure and legal constraints to 
accumulation. 
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THE REGULATION OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN PARLIAMENT: 
THE CASE OF THE PORTUGUESE ASSEMBLEIA DA REPÚBLICA 
 
LUÍS DE SOUSA, ARC Research Associate, Political Science Program, RSSS and Policy and Governance 
Program, APSEG, ANU 
 
In recent years, the problematic relationship between conflicts of interest and corruption has 
been a sensitive one to democracy. Although conflicts of interest have not always resulted in 
corruption, they do constitute an important opportunity structure for such illicit behaviour. 
The introduction or revision of rules of disclosure and incompatibilities – as a means to 
secure the equality of citizens concerns before representative institutions; to ensure 
transparency on interest representation; to make representatives accountable to their 
electorate; and to guarantee the impartiality/objectivity and integrity/selflessness of MPs in 
performing the duties and prerogatives associated with their representative mandate – was 
part of the package of legislative measures implemented during the late 1980s and early 
1990s to curb the incidence and scope of corruption in political life. 
 
The Portuguese attempt at implementing rules of disclosure of MPs’ assets and interests or 
limiting accumulation with outside jobs and activities has been paradigmatic: eight 
legislative interventions to the first Statute of MPs in less than two decades. In all these 
legislative initiatives, MPs were unable to create an appropriate ethical framework to prevent 
financial impropriety in office deriving from the accumulation of the parliamentary mandate 
with other outside jobs and activities. The incremental nature of adjustments and the peculiar 
“tailor made” nature of regulation raise important aspects in regard both to the scope and 
efficacy of the instruments adopted as well as the legislators’ intentions and willingness to 
move on with the necessary reforms. 
 
Another important aspect of the Portuguese approach at reforming conflict of interest 
regulation is the adoption of instruments from countries where they seem fit and effective. In 
spite of the legislators’ increased knowledge about successes and failures of foreign 
regulatory experiences and the subsequent importation of instruments “experimented” or “in 
place” abroad, this institutional copycat only goes as far as importing the form, but not the 
essence of the control structure. Portuguese legislators have been guilty of admiring the 
outcome of the self-regulatory Westminster approach while overlooking its method. 
Unfortunately, the importation of models and approaches has taken place more easily and 
faster than the expected convergence of ethical standards across the two very different 
political systems. For that reason, neither the regulatory performance and reform efforts of 
the Portuguese Assembleia da República can be assessed without taking into consideration 
specific lines of legal-historical development, nor the MPs’ poor record on making control 
frameworks workable can be disassociated from the overall indifference of Portuguese 
society towards conflicts of interest. 
 
This paper attempts to assess the way Portugal has addressed the problem of conflicts of 
interest in parliament through the analysis of the rules of disclosure and legal constraints to 
accumulation adopted. 
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THE REGULATION OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN PARLIAMENT: 
THE CASE OF THE PORTUGUESE ASSEMBLEIA DA REPÚBLICA 
 
 
“Law and morality may succeed for a time in holding 
human appetites, ambitions and propensities in check, 
but when opportunities arise, they will break out again 
from the depths of the human heart.” Theophrastus 
 
 
1. A Brief Historical Background to Reform in Western Democracies 
 
In recent years, the problematic relationship between conflicts of interest and corruption has 
been a sensitive one in most democracies. The changing nature of the State and the blurring of 
the public/private divide have been at the core of recent cases of corruption, alerting decision-
makers to the need to strengthen controls and reinforce public ethics. Corruption grows where 
the distinction between public or private interests, which is so central to democratic 
administrative and political systems, is neither legally regulated and enforced, nor socially 
expected. Even if conflicts of interest have not always resulted in corruption, they do 
constitute an important opportunity structure for such illicit behaviour. 
 
Cases of financial impropriety in office have varied across countries and so have the moral 
costs against these practices. Of particular relevance have been the increasing occurrences of 
corruption, influence trafficking and profiteering at the parliamentary level. The inadequacy 
of conflict of interest rules to MPs, in the light of increased opportunities for illicit behaviour, 
posed a serious threat to the ethical standards underpinning representative institutions. On the 
one hand, opportunity structures for corruption and impropriety in parliament grew apace due 
to the interaction of a number of transformations: the increased regulatory function of the 
State; the expansion of political consulting and lobbying firms; the changing nature of 
national political elites; the decline in the popularity and visibility of national representative 
functions; the “payroll” vote relationship between MPs and the executive; and the possibility 
of accumulating several offices, jobs or mandates. On the other hand, the costs imposed upon 
conflicts of interest in parliament have been substantially reduced: weakened ethics and 
controls inside party structures and the house of parliament; weak conflict of interest rules 
applying to elective officials; and more worryingly, a tolerant environment towards these 
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exchanges. These are some of the conditions that help us to understand the complex nature of 
the problem and the difficult task of introducing a workable regulatory framework. 
 
Unlike public office, one of the major difficulties in regulating conflicts of interest in 
parliament is that MPs, or any elective official to that matter, are temporary office holders, 
whose permanence in office is dependent upon (re)election. Hence it is difficult to make them 
accept and guide their conduct by the same principles which govern civil servants and to 
impose credible sanctions, which aim at clearing conflicts of interest in a continuum, i.e. prior 
to and following the holding of office.1 For that reason, legal frameworks regulating conflict 
of interests have often aimed only at targeting specific situations of conflict which are more 
prone to threaten the probity of office holders while in office. The object of control is therefore 
the accumulation of elective office with certain jobs and positions across different spheres of 
activity. Controls address the office itself rather than its holder. A more comprehensive 
initiative to conflicts of interest would require that they be addressed in a continuum as 
opportunity structures for illicit behaviour, emerging from past or future interactions between 
actors positioned in different spheres of activity which may put the public interest at risk. This 
continuous scrutiny of conflicts of interest has not been an easy solution to implement. 
Whereas, in some regimes, elective officials have been impeded from entering contractual 
agreements with certain business sectors after leaving office, as part of a conflict of interest 
                                                 
1 In Portugal, the law 42/96, which came to review incompatibilities and impediments to elective and senior 
public officials, introduced a new art. 9-A (previous professional activities) aimed at constraining situations of 
conflict taking place before entering office. Elective and senior public officials – MPs excluded! – who have 
detained directive positions or a certain share in capital in private companies during the three years prior to 
entering office, were excluded from celebrating any contract or from being suppliers of goods and services to the 
State or any public entity to that effect and to take part in any public decision or administrative procedure, such 
as the concession of change of authorisations and licensing, acts of expropriation, the concession of patrimonial 
benefits, in which those companies were parties. These impediments were obviously aiming at safeguarding the 
impartiality and rectitude of office holders during any contractual or commercial relation between the state and 
any public entity and private actors. An interesting exception, however, was set by art. 9(2): those who have 
detained those directive positions in private companies doing business with the State by public appointment were 
excluded from such impediment. The risk of this exception is notorious, in the sense that it does not demand the 
same requirements of impartiality and rectitude from those ministers or secretaries of state recruited from the 
B.o.D.s of newly privatised public and semi-public companies. The consequence is both situations of personal 
enrichment at the ministerial level due to the use of privileged information and the establishment of solid 
clientelistic and privileged relationships between the executive and these companies in detriment of fairness and 
impartiality. 
 The document aimed at reducing the opportunity structures for corruption emerging out of situations of 
conflict of interest, yet there was great disparity in relation to the penalties imposed to elective or public officials. 
Article 14 provides that any acts and contracts celebrated under these conditions will be considered null and the 
senior public officials who have acted in conflict will be suspended from their duties for a period of three years. 
Elective officials, i.e. governmental officials, are excluded from punishment. One practical reason for that is the 
fact that their mandate might have ended by the time a conflict of interest is ascertained. In practice, this means 
that the proclaimed standards of “exemption” and “rectitude” demanded by this legal document to elective 
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clearance system, in most cases, they are only required to submit a declaration of interests and 
activities (i.e. declaration of honour) before taking and when leaving office. Even with the 
adoption of a register of interests, more often than not, declarations are not clear, systematic 
or representative of the interests and activities held by the elective officials in question. 
 
The reforms on regimes of incompatibility that took place during the late 1980s and early 
1990s show that not all elective offices were paid the same attention by legislators. Reforms 
have targeted those offices which are most exposed to media scrutiny and where the unveiling 
of a conflict of interest may trigger scandal. However, public opinion understanding of the 
risk of conflicts of interest to the due process in democracy varies from one country to another, 
from one period to another. In countries like Portugal, there is a myriad of situations of 
conflict that are perfectly acceptable to office-holders and citizens at large and, therefore, have 
not been subject to reform. In such a climate of toleration, it is unlikely that legal impediments 
will be adopted to constrain elective officials to adopt a particular posture in office. Unelected 
ministers, ministerial cabinet appointees and advisers, and local elective officials are still 
exercising their prerogatives under a feeble conflict of interest framework. The risks for 
impropriety are great and have only been minimised, to a very limited extent, by the media 
visibility of some of these positions. However, the watchdog role of the media in these matters 
is still inexistent. 
 
Traditionally, conflict of interest rules have been particularly flexible and limited concerning 
the accumulation of a parliamentary mandate with private activities and interests. For a long 
time, such impediments were viewed as an encroachment on the representative function of 
MPs, hence they were kept to a minimum. The holding of private/professional activities 
cumulatively with the parliamentary mandate was perceived as a means of preventing an 
undesirable level of professionalisation of MPs, a method of enriching legislative works and 
debates and a mechanism enabling interest groups to voice their concerns in parliament. 
 
In recent years, however, the functionality of such accumulation to representation has been 
overtly contested and difficult to sustain in the light of a series of scandals of financial 
impropriety deriving from conflicts of interest. The increased media reported instances of 
collusion between money and politics, between public and private interests in parliament, 
                                                                                                                                                         
officials can only be safeguarded if the government, its leader, or the party in parliament, imposes a political 
sanction, something highly unlikely to be put into practice. 
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through the “selling” of parliamentary procedures, privileged information, influence, and even 
amendments in legislation, proved costly to representative institutions. The abuse of office 
and its prerogatives for personal benefit – profiteering – helped to widen the gap between 
voters and the political class: 
 
‘That “politicians” are blamed emphasizes the fact that they constitute a privileged group and a class in 
their own right, a nomenklatura, greedy for its privileges in contrast to popular and national virtues’ 
(Mény 1996, 320). 
 
The visible aspects of financial impropriety became the ingredient for a ‘confrontational 
attitude’ (Mény 1996, 320) between the “haves” – i.e. “the politicians”/“them” – and the 
“have nots” – “the people”/“us” - wisely exploited by populist parties/movements which saw 
their electoral chances improving during this period. However, it was not just the ostentation 
and greediness of “a few rotten apples” that triggered public discontent, but the systematic 
way - or at least the perception of it - in which elective officials had profiteered illicitly from 
their office and prerogatives. It is true that MPs, parliaments, parties, the tenets of 
representative democracy, have never enjoyed great confidence from citizens at large, but, in 
some countries, the seriousness and systemic nature of these practices, put the dignity of 
parliament and the contractual relationship between voters and their representatives at risk for 
years to come.2 
 
Regulating conflicts of interest to elective officials has become a standard corruption control 
concern in the majority of democracies worldwide. Having said this, if an unregulated 
environment is no longer an acceptable condition to the exercise of office prerogatives, most 
legislators are still finding hard to know exactly what does regulation need to address or, in 
other words, what constitutes conflict of interest, how much regulation is sufficient to 
safeguard their impartiality without encroaching with their representative function and 
                                                 
2 It was not surprising, therefore, when, as a reaction to the wave of scandals on impropriety in British politics, 
such as the “cash for questions” saga and the Hamilton-Greer-Al Fayed affair, Lord Nolan suggested that it was 
‘vital for the democratic process, that Members of Parliament should maintain the highest standards of propriety 
in discharging their obligations to the public which elects them. It is also essential for public confidence that they 
should be seen to do so’ (First Nolan Report 1995, 20). Two Gallup polls carried out in 1984 and 1995 
respectively, showed that 64% of the public agreed that “most MPs make a lot of money by using office 
improperly”, a figure that has risen from 46% in 1984. The same survey showed 77% of the people interviewed 
believed that “MPs care more about special interests than about people like themselves” compared to 67% scored 
previously. 
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political nature of their mandate,3 and what model is preferred: honorary, disclosure, legal 
constraints or a combination of the three?  
 
The universe of cases unveiled by the media varied from one country to another and that 
explains the diversified answers to the problem. Although the most problematic instances to 
control have been conflicts rising between elective and private jobs and interests, which will 
be the main focus of this study, the measures adopted have equally touched other kinds of 
conflicts no less relevant such as the accumulation of elective and governmental/appointed 
office or of several mandates across different levels of government, a practice know to the 
French as cumul des mandats.4 
 
There is no panacea or standardised model of reform. Countries have responded differently 
according to their own legal and institutional traditions. Some countries have attempted to 
address conflicts of interest through the adoption or revision of impediments, incompatibility, 
                                                 
3 Elective officials need to demonstrate work done, if seeking re-election. Politics is about winning elections and 
getting re-elected, hence it is not sufficient for an elective official to show rectitude in office, he/she also needs to 
deliver. This, however, tends to be more a problem to executive offices than legislative ones. Direct political 
accountability to voter should not be overemphasized with regard to MPs. In many democracies, such as 
Portugal, the representative link between MPs and their constituents is feeble, hence accountability at the ballot 
box, if it does take place, it is meant to the incumbent party or coalition and not to the single individual. 
4 On October 1994, the parliamentary working group “Politique et argent” gave an approximate picture of the 
extension of this practice: out of 450 MPs who accumulated their parliamentary seat with another mandate, 446 
held cumulatively local executive and regional elective functions, the remaining 4 were also Euro-MPs. Most 
instances of corruption which took place in France during the early 1990s, involved politicians performing at 
different levels of decision-making (local, national and European) and across different spheres of activity (public, 
parapublic, private) thanks to accumulation. As Mény put it, ‘La corruption à la française fonctionne à la 
confusion des rôles et des genres [...] Qu’on ne se méprenne pas: tous ceux qui cumulent ne sont pas corrompus 
heureusement! -, mais la structure du cumul et plus généralement la tolérance à l’égard du conflit d’intérêts sont 
au coeur du problème’ (‘Corruption – Leçons françaises du cas Italien’, Le Monde, 30 September 1994, 2). 
Nonetheless, the problem of cumul is not just a French concern. The First Report by the Committee of 
Independent Experts on Allegations Regarding Fraud, Mismanagement, and Nepotism in the European 
Commission, which would culminate with the Santer Commission’s decision to resign, found that the 
accumulation of local, regional or national and European mandates was at the heart of many instances of 
favouritism by certain commissioners. The ex-President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi also 
alerted to the growing dysfunction of representation caused by MEPs accumulating their seat in Strasbourg with 
other national elective offices (La Reppublica, Friday 30 march 2001, Politica Interna, 23). His intervention was 
essentially directed to Italian and French MEPs who are still allowed to exercise cumulatively both national and 
European parliamentary mandates contrary to the prohibition of such accumulation by most national regulatory 
frameworks. Most member-states have banned such type of accumulation in the light of the incompatibility that 
is often placed between representatives of the first and second parliamentary chambers. The problem at stake, 
however, is not longer the accumulation between national and European parliamentary mandates, which has been 
gradually curtailed and banned in most member-states, but between European and local ones. Mayor MEPs other 
than MPs-MEPs are the main challenge to any workable and comprehensive conflict of interest framework (to 
be) adopted by the European Parliament. In this regards, the EP will not only encounter different national 
regulatory arrangements to MEPs but, more importantly, different attitudes by national voters and political elites 
alike regarding the accumulation of local elective functions with the European parliamentary mandate. 
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and disqualification rules.5 Others ventured on a more comprehensive reform, which also 
included setting codes of conduct, introducing inductive guidance to new MPs, and revising or 
reinforcing rules of disclosure. In most instances, however, the process of reform has proved 
to be a sensitive and contested one, creating enough turmoil in backbenches. Reformers are 
often trapped between pressure from their peers and from public opinion at large. Evidence of 
this is the fact that these reforms, especially when it comes to the adoption of (new) 
impediments, are always negotiated together with a review of parliamentary privilege, and the 
wage and benefits of parliamentarians. There is nothing wrong with the carrot and stick 
strategy to formulate control measures aimed at curbing or preventing the likelihood of certain 
conducts in office. In practice, however, the carrot has often been bigger and sweeter than the 
stick. In other words, during the process of reviewing conflict of interest regulations as 
response to scandal or growing public concern, politicians have tended to raise or secure their 
privileges and perks without a tantamount increase on obligations and constraints. This is 
partly due to the tailor-made nature of legislative measures aimed at curbing corruption in 
political life: conflicts of interest rules are aimed at controlling/regulating the conduct of the 
very same people who legislate. Another common characteristic across country responses is 
the scandal-driven nature of reform. More often than not, addressing conflicts of interests to 
elective officials, and MPs in particular have been late responses to specific scandals rather 
than a proactive and long-term effort to curb conflicts of interest in parliament. The outcome 
of this legislative process is often characterised by two interrelated pitfalls: the 
institutionalisation of situations of conflict, i.e. the need to establish by law what ethics cannot 
prevent; and the trivialisation of control, the avoidance of stringent impediments through the 
introduction of symbolic or cosmetic reforms on the regime of incompatibilities as a reaction 
to crisis situations. 
 
 
2. Concepts and options 
 
Before assessing recent Portuguese attempts at regulating conflicts of interest in parliament, it 
is worthwhile untangling the various concepts involved: What do we mean by conflict of 
interest? What are the conceptual differences between the major regulatory options available: 
                                                 
5 In Portugal, for example, the Laws 9/90 of 1 March (art. 11) and 56/90 of 5 September (art. 7) introduced new 
incompatibilities to political office similar to those of senior public officials, whereas parliamentary office 
remained subject to special regulation, i.e. the Statute of MPs. 
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disclosure, disqualification and incompatibility rules? And why is it important to regulate for 
conflicts of interest in parliament? 
 
The term “conflicts of interest” is yet another jargon of politics for which there is no 
universally accepted definition. Any tentative definition is unlikely to cover all possible 
scenarios, but should try to satisfy the most of one’s research objectives. Conflicts of interest 
is when office-holders are placed in a situation in which their professional impartial judgment 
concerning a primary interest (the public interest) can be or perceived to be unduly influenced 
by or subjugated to other competing secondary (private) interests (Williams 1985; Mény 
1992; Kaye 2001 and 2003).6 
 
Conflicts of interest are not deviant conduct or practice per se, but a condition which may lead 
office-holders to undermine the prerogatives and expectations attached to their office for 
private regards in the pursuit of public affairs. Hence, they are not inherently bad or avoidable 
at all times. It is rather the way they will be handled by the officer-holder in question and the 
regulatory instruments in place that can lead to inappropriate or undesirable consequences. 
 
Despite many attempts at classifying these situations (bias, conflict of conscience, potential 
and actual conflict) and creating a sort of yardstick upon which regulators can make their 
evaluations and justify their preventive priorities, the conflicts of interest scenarios which 
office-holders can face on a daily basis remain patchy and their public condemnation 
unpredictable. Let us consider the following scenario. While few people would probably 
question an opposition MP who decides to help the incumbent’s budget proposal to pass in 
parliament by one vote majority – even if against his party will – because it devotes large 
sums of public investment to its constituency; his position would probably trigger immediate 
disapproval if it was unveiled that such public investment is destined to revitalise a small 
number of industries, which had been important financial contributors to his last campaign 
other than having employed his wife as a managing director. Confronted with a journalist’s 
question on his alleged conflict of interest, the MP would claim that his mandate demands 
loyalty to his constituents’ interests and that his “sympathy for the cause” of these small 
number of industrials will have a spill-over effect and eventually produce a “greater good” to 
his constituency by creating new jobs and fostering local development. This scenario shows 
                                                 
6 Although conflicts of interest can also take place in the private sphere alone, this article will be addressing only 
those situations which concern public office-holders, in particular, MPs. 
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how the condemnation of conflicts of interest is not always clear-cut, especially when ethical 
standards expectations are confronted with development questions and clientelistic contexts. 
 
Although the term conflict of interest does not automatically suggest any pecuniary or non-
pecuniary advantages drawn by office-holders from the subversion of their impartial 
judgement, profiteering has become central to the distinction between conflicts of interest and 
other bias or conflicting situations in the pursuit of public affairs, which remain outside the 
focus of regulatory efforts. 
 
The second problem, which relates to the first, is what model of regulation should be adopted? 
There are essentially two approaches to addressing conflicts of interest (voluntary/soft or 
regulatory/hard) and three models of regulation: honour system, rules of disclosure and legal 
limitations to accumulation (ineligibility, disqualification and incompatibilities) (Kaye 2001). 
Most countries tend to display a mixture of all three. 
 
It would be sufficient that all MPs shared a common understanding of what negative influence 
and impartiality meant, to make them refrain from entering into a situation of conflict. The 
honour system of regulation is based on the assumption that MPs know the basic principles 
and standards they are expected to apply to their work and where the boundaries of acceptable 
behaviour lie, because these have been clearly transmitted to them. The honour system is, 
therefore, a soft approach to conflicts of interest regulation, which puts emphasis on induction, 
codes of conduct - i.e. a concise, well-publicised statement of core ethical standards and 
principles that guide elective office – training and education with the ultimate objective of 
creating a shared understanding across elective officials and voters at large. However, 
standards of democratic governance might not be always harmonious and compatible as it is 
often suggested – market-imported principles, such as cost-efficacy and efficiency may clash 
with more traditional ones, like fairness and accountability – and different people and cultures 
have different understandings of the boundaries between public and private. For that reason, it 
is necessary to agree on a set of legal parameters to the interpretation of those standards. 
Despite any reasonable relativist criticism on the cultural looseness of ethical standards and 
skepticism on the enforcement of “ethics laws” in political life, a comprehensive legal 
framework is still the basis for communicating the minimum obligatory standards of conduct 
for every office-holder. Laws and regulations must state what are the fundamental values 
expected from elective office and put in place a framework for guidance, monitoring, inquiry, 
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and sanctioning. Of the various legal instruments put in place to regulate conflicts of interest, 
two have been emblematic: rules of disclosure and incompatibilities. 
 
Rules of disclosure are essentially meant to provide public control over the elective officials’ 
assets and interests before, during and after leaving office by rendering these transparent to 
citizens. Elective officials have to guarantee that they have the integrity and impartiality 
required to hold office. It is not sufficient that an elective official declares himself/herself to 
be honest, since there would be a myriad of interpretations of what is meant by “honesty”. 
Some basic legal rules are laid down to create parity amongst elective officials and to 
establish objective obligations to the exercise of their representative mandate. The principles 
of transparency and accountability are viewed by this control measure as a pre-condition to 
the integrity and impartiality required to hold elective office. There are important variations 
across countries in terms of the addressees, the modes of disclosure (oral and written), the 
contents of declarations, the time scope of provisions and the monitoring and sanctioning 
procedures adopted. 
 
Incompatibility rules aim at regulating those activities or jobs whose accumulation is 
considered to be in conflict with the representative mandate, but unlike ineligibility or 
disqualification rules, candidates found in a situation of conflict are not precluded from 
acceding to office. The validity of the electoral act is not questioned. Once a situation of 
conflict is asserted, the candidate elected is allowed to choose within a predetermined period, 
often short, between holding his mandate or the job or activity incompatible with it. Regimes 
of incompatibility are meant to act both as preventive and corrective measures against 
corruption by addressing conflicts of interest. On the one hand, these rules comprise 
legal/formal constraints aimed at reducing or excluding certain types of interaction and 
accumulation deemed unhealthy to democracy. MPs may be legally precluded from 
accumulating their mandate with public functions, private activities or other local, regional, 
national and European mandates. On the other hand, a series of controls are meant to monitor, 
unveil and sanction those situations in which the MP does not show the objectivity and 
exemption required to hold elective office. 
 
Countries have traditionally regarded incompatibility regimes as primarily designed to uphold 
the principle of division of powers within the State apparatus by avoiding the concentration of 
decisional power in the hands of a few people. Incompatibility rules targeted conflicts of 
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interest emerging from horizontal accumulation, i.e. between the parliamentary mandate and 
public, judicial appointed and ministerial offices and from vertical accumulation, i.e. between 
the parliamentary mandate and other mandates. In recent years, however, incompatibility rules 
have gradually shifted to regulate a series of conflicts of interest hitherto ignored or regarded 
compatible with, if not functional to, the exercise of a parliamentary mandate. Some of these 
legal constraints to “oblique” accumulation are meant to avoid the mingling of elective/public 
and private interests, hence reducing the likelihood of undue business influence over the 
decision-making process. 
 
 
2.1. Why does it matter to regulate conflicts of interest? 
 
Democracies rest upon an ideal distinction between public and private spheres and interests, 
and the belief that a key number of standards governing public life – such as impartiality, 
transparency, accountability and integrity – must be observed at all times, something which 
has never been fully achieved in any country hitherto. 
 
These principles can be sworn to both under democratic and non-democratic regimes, but 
there are substantial differences that need to be taken into consideration: whereas a non-
democratic regime can do without ethical standards governing public life, democracy can only 
afford to be bad at observing them with considerable costs to its legitimacy and support. The 
inability or impossibility of achieving ideal democracy leaves no better choice than to accept 
real democracy at its face value. As Churchill once put it, “Democracy is the worst form of 
government except for all those others that have been tried.” 
 
It is not so much the statement of these principles in constitutional or legal documents that 
makes the difference – even non-democratic regimes can claim to uphold them – but how they 
are actually incorporated into the functioning of institutions, appropriated and observed by 
office holders and demanded/expected from citizens at large. Hence, if non-democratic 
regimes can (only) survive without transparency, democracies cannot do without a free press 
and free access to information. Non-democratic regimes can do without political 
accountability; democracies cannot do without the citizens’ right to reward or punish 
incumbents by vote. Non-democratic regimes can afford to be crooked (repression, fear, an 
ignorant and, often, poor society are their rectitude tool kit); democracies cannot handle 
 12
scandal caused by the unveiled dishonesty of their leaders, without great risk to its 
performance. Non-democratic regimes can afford to be unjust (power is justice); democracies 
must bind power to justice and protect minorities against the tyranny of the majority. 
Although democracies are not good at addressing and putting into practice ethical standards to 
office holders that does not invalidate their importance in framing voters’ evaluations about 
the way democracies work and/or are expected to work. 
 
Conflict of interest represents a threat to the ethical standards underpinning democratic 
governance in so far the public interest can be subjugated to private ones. Elective officials 
with a conflict of interest will give a different or distorted reading of the authority entrusted 
on them by their principal (the voter) and of their office prerogatives, which they would 
otherwise not do if they were not in a conflicting situation. The unpredictability and 
complexity of conflicts of interest and the impracticability of honour being a sufficient 
deterrent, has led governments and legislatures to regulate them by putting in place systems of 
monitoring and enforcement. 
 
Regardless whether conflicts of interest might result in corruption or net financial gain to 
elective officials or third parties, they still represent a threat to the principles of impartiality, 
transparency, accountability and integrity underpinning democratic governance. Although the 
degree of success of national regulatory frameworks in safeguarding these principles has been 
considerably different across countries, suggesting that their understanding is always subject 
to particular tensions and value conflicts, it is still possible to grasp their essence: 
 
• impartiality, conflict of interest regulation is meant to safeguard the objectivity and 
selflessness of elective officials in the pursue of their duties and prerogatives. Impartiality, 
in carrying out public affairs, means two interrelated things: that elective officials must 
make choices on merit and take decisions in terms of the public interest and not as a means 
to seek and secure financial or other advantages for themselves, their family or their 
friends. 
• transparency, conflict of interest regulation is meant to ensure clear and comprehensive 
disclosure of all assets and interests held by elective officials (and, to an extent, their 
close relatives) in connection to their public duties, and to make them available for public 
scrutiny. Elective officials must enable citizens and their colleagues to see through their 
financial activities and interests at all times and to resolve without delay any situation 
susceptible of creating public suspicion. Transparency other than being an external 
demand is also a collegial duty; 
• accountability, conflicts of interest regulation is meant to ensure regular, effective and 
impartial monitoring of elective officials’ assets and secondary interests and activities and 
to put in place a workable sanctioning framework. Although elective officials tend to be 
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made accountable only for the occurrences taking place while in the conduct of public 
business, some regulatory frameworks place restrictions prior and after leaving office; 
• Integrity, conflicts of interest regulation is meant to ensure that elective officials avoid any 
financial or other obligation to outside individuals or organisations that might have a 
negative influence on their judgement and take steps to resolve any conflicts arising from 
their private interests in connection to their public duties in a way that protects the public 
interest. Prudence and honesty come before monitoring and sanctioning. 
 
The analysis that follows aims to address the way Portugal as regulated conflicts of interest by 
placing disclosure obligations and setting incompatibilities to MPs and to what extent these 
have safeguard the principles at stake. 
 
 
3. Rules of disclosure: symbolic public control and the protection of vested interests 
 
The 1983 regime of “public control on the wealth of elective officials” was the first attempt to 
control the assets of elective officials and tackle financial impropriety in office by means of 
disclosure. The instrument was part of a broader legislative and institutional reform by the 
then PS-PSD coalition (Bloco Central) to combat corruption in public life. The government’s 
strategy was based on three pillars: the revision of penal provisions,7 the creation of the High 
Authority Against Corruption (AACC)8 and the introduction of public control on the wealth of 
elective officials - Lei 4/83, 2 Abril 1983, Controle público da riqueza dos titulares de cargos 
políticos.9 
 
The Law 4/83 had been created at time of important social, economic and institutional 
changes. Private interests were gradually re-organising and entering into the political arena, 
following the purges of market actors that took place between 1974-76. The IXth 
constitutional government started re-privatising the banking and insurance sectors and a series 
of nationalised industries following the recommendations of the second IMF austerity 
programme. The need to restore citizens’ trust and support for the political-institutional and 
social-economic transformations in course was a priority to the new government coalition. 
The setting of new ethical principles disciplining instruments to elective officials aimed at 
strengthening the credibility of representative actors and institutions fundamental to a 
                                                 
7 Decreto-Lei 371/83. 
8 Decreto-Lei 369/83. 
9  The Decreto-regulamentar 74/83 of 6 October 1983 set deadlines and clarified terms for the effective 
applicability of the law 4/83 
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democracy in consolidation. The transparency of the financial status of elective officials 
served as an instrument against growing anti-democratic feelings that saw in the lack of 
transparency and probity of the political a condition for the attack on the system of 
representation and the democratic institutions. The new regime of “public control on the 
wealth of elective officials” was therefore perceived quintessential to improve ethical 
standards in political life. However, the instruments of control put in place were few and far 
from guaranteeing the transparency, accountability and integrity invoked during the 
preparation of this legislative document. The symbolism of the legislation was tantamount to 
the inefficacy of its provisions. “Public control” was a euphemism, both from the perspective 
of monitoring and public access to declarations. The regime had been designed in a way as to 
protect the financial interests of elective officials from unnecessary public intrusion and 
scrutiny, especially from journalists. 
 
The principle of transparency was cut short by a limited interpretation of what disclosure 
meant and what constituted object of disclosure. Disclosure of patrimonial assets and wealth 
of politicians as opposed to the registration/declaration of interests was the core strategy 
adopted to promote financial transparency in political life. As one author to the project put it, 
the regime in consideration aimed only ‘to control the financial status of the office holder by 
means of his own declaration’ (Vilhena de Carvalho, ASDI, debate on 27 January 1983, 
translation by the author). 
 
This form of disclosure would prove insufficient to make visible cases of financial 
impropriety and even less to constrain potential conflicts of interest. The submission of 
declarations was compulsory and their contents detailed, but rules of enforcement were 
precarious, to the extent that a large number of elective officials interpreted the Law 4/83 as a 
voluntary regime. Those who complied with the law and submitted their declarations 
remained with the conviction that whatever they declared would not threaten their vested 
financial interests. Although the precursors of this legislative project had continuously alerted 
that it did not suffice that elective officials were honest, but ‘like Caesar’s wife, they must 
appear to be and to present themselves as honest to the public’ (Orador, ASDI, debate on 27 
January 1983, translation by the author), prudence and honesty remained, however, wishful 
thinking. 
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MPs saw on the mechanism of declaration a substitute of the duty to inform parliament and 
the public at large about interests that were likely to affect or might have affected their 
impartiality or integrity even if these were not explicitly addressed by the legal requisites of 
disclosure. The compulsory submission of patrimonial declarations raised the belief amongst 
MPs that once these were deposited with the monitoring body, their innocence and integrity 
were guaranteed. Once MPs had disclosed what they wanted to disclose, further public 
intrusion into their personal financial interests was perceived as an unjustified violation of 
their privacy and a challenge to their self-proclaimed honesty. 
 
If there was no guarantee that these declarations were fully comprehensive and illustrative of 
the wealth and patrimony of elective officials as well as the variety of private interests these 
represented, there was equally no way of proving against the alleged “sincerity” and 
“honesty” of politicians. The law lacked efficient mechanisms of monitoring and sanctioning. 
 
The principle of accountability was equally tainted given the various legal/formal obstacles 
put in place to external monitoring and free access to information. In principle, public access 
to information had been provided for under art. 5.2.10 In practice, however, the 1983 regime of 
disclosure operated under a discritionary mechanism of public access imposed by the 
“justified legitimate and relevant interest” rule, which would render impracticable any 
realistic “public” control on standards of financial propriety in political life. 
 
Monitoring competencies were attributed to the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional, 
hereafter TC). Although the TC enjoyed credibility and the consensus of all political forces, 
its monitoring action up to now has been cumbersome. The TC acted like an “old register”, i.e. 
a depository body which decided almost “arbitrarily” public access to declarations, instead of 
monitoring its contents and evolution and demanding further judicial investigation when 
relevant elements of impropriety were found. According to Lobo Antunes (1995), this resulted 
largely from the fact that the TC was continuously confronted with the uncomfortable task of 
having to present a clear judgement on matters which concerned essentially political 
evaluations. In other words, the decision on the “legitimate and relevant interest” of any 
member of the public or entity without criminal investigative powers to access patrimonial 
                                                 
10 ‘Têm acesso às declarações e decisões previstas no nº 1 quaisquer cidadãos que justifiquem, perante aquele 
Tribunal, interesse relevante no respectivo conhecimento, podendo ser dada publicidade, por decisão do mesmo 
Tribunal, a um extracto das mesmas, nos termos do seu Regimento’. 
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declarations was essentially of a political nature, hence inappropriate to be justified according 
to objective juridical criteria. The TC’s inadequacy to monitor the patrimonial declarations 
resulted not so much from its being an external body to parliament, but from the way its 
competencies had been framed and attributed under the Law 4/83. 
 
From the outset, legislators had difficulty in explaining how the Constitutional Court would 
monitor and manage public access to patrimonial declarations. The law had stipulated that the 
TC would operate according to its internal statutes (Regimento). In reality, however, there 
were no internal statutes and that is the reason why a statutory decree11 had to be issued some 
months later to establish the way in which declarations could be acceded for consultation 
following the Court’s decision. But the problem of delegation of competencies was not 
completely solved. When confronted with requests by members of the public to access 
patrimonial declarations, there was a continuous and confusing “ball passing game” between 
the TC’s college and its President in terms of who had what competency in deciding the 
relevance and legitimacy of public access to declarations. In practice, this has resulted in the 
TC insistently giving a restricted interpretation on what was meant by “justified” and 
“unjustified” access to declarations. The Court’s position was unequivocal: access was 
“justified” when asked for by the MP concerned or judicial institutions and “unjustified” when 
requested by the media or normal citizens. There was no “public control” of financial 
impropriety by elective officials as such by the simple fact that the right of free access to and 
scrutiny of patrimonial declarations were continuously denied to members of the public. 
Through a hesitant, inconsistent and contradictory jurisprudence,12 the Constitutional Court 
was gradually perceived as being the gatekeeper of the financial interests of the political 
class.13 
 
The sanction framework targeted essentially those who refused to comply with the law. Art. 3 
provided that MPs would be dismissed from office when failing to submit their first 
                                                 
11 Decreto Regulamentar 74/83 of 6 October which has now been given a different reading by Dec. Reg. 1/2000 
of 9 March. 
12 The Acórdãos do Tribunal Constitucional presents a selective publication of the Court’s decisions on the field 
for doctrinal purposes only. Names and references of the politicians involved are omitted. Nonetheless, it is 
possible to capture the essence of the TC’s position on the “justified legitimate and relevant interest” rule: 
justified – the AACC, the Public Ministry, the Judiciary Police, the Court of Criminal Instruction; unjustified – 
the media. 
13 For instance, the TC had continuously shown reluctance to report to the Public Ministry cases in which 
declarations were not submitted or the contents were inaccurate, because it considered that such procedure was 
not explicitly of its competency. 
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patrimonial declaration and declared ineligible for a period of one to five years when failing to 
submit their final patrimonial declaration. Since public officials can qualify as candidates 
without having to resign from their previous functions, the electoral sanctions stipulated 
would not affect them suitably. For that reason, and in order to create parity amongst 
candidates with different professional backgrounds, the regime of disclosure set disciplinary 
sanctions to those public officials who failed to submit their patrimonial declarations. 
 
With regard to those who cheated disclosure requirements, however, the law imposed very 
low costs. Although the regime provided that false or misleading declarations could be treated 
as criminal offence, its applicability was cut short given the lack of proper monitoring 
procedures and the courts’ inability to try these offences. In two court decisions, the Tribunal 
da Relação de Lisboa established that the omission or untruthfulness about the contents of 
patrimonial declarations was a criminal act, but not of a penal nature. Instead, it was 
confusingly defined as “an administrative offence sui generis”, therefore precluding normal 
courts from treating these cases (Cf. Acórdão 21/01/87, Acórdão 4/02/87).14 The inadequacy 
of disciplining created a climate of impunity, as evidenced by the poor record of crime 
processes initiated against those who failed to comply with the Law 4/83. During the period 
between 1983 and 1988, out of 1945 investigative processes initiated, only 175 found their 
way to the courts (of which 126 were granted an amnesty, 48 prescribed and only 1 was 
sanctioned). 
 
Throughout the 1980s, MPs had become imprudent about their privileges, sometimes 
believing themselves to be a sort of “untouchables”. On 19 April 1988, the AACC produced a 
memorandum in which it condemned the lassitude installed in parliament with regard to rules 
of disclosure and recommended the revision of enforcement procedures.15 Not only had the 
majority of MPs systematically failed to submit their patrimonial declarations, their non-
compliance was not being sanctioned as expected.16 The Law 4/83 had been arbitrarily and 
wrongfully interpreted as a voluntary regime - obviously, by voluntary elective officials meant 
non-compliance. 
 
                                                 
14 Colectânea da Jurisprudência, Ano XII-1987, Tomo I, 152, 164. 
15 The reform of the Law 4/83 and the criminalisation of certain practices/behaviours in the political sphere – in 
the light of the outmoded Law 266 of 27 July 1914 - was the starting point of the AACC’s crusade against 
corruption and financial impropriety by elective officials that would cost its existenc (Cf. AACC, Relatório 
1984-1986, [Medidas Legislativas], 114; AACC, Relatório 1988-1989, I, 148). 
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The regime of disclosure set under the Law 4/83 had failed to materialise the heralded 
principles of transparency, accountability and integrity. The mechanisms put in place failed to 
address seriously citizens’ concern about the honesty of their political leaders. 
 
 
3.1. Introducing the Register of Interests 
 
The demand for reform of the 1983 rules of disclosure came almost ten years later, in January 
1992. A series of projects of law were presented in parliament, but the constitutional and 
institutional difficulties raised to the revision of provisions set under the Law 4/83 were 
several. On December 1994, the Social Democrat majority in parliament passed a decree 
(Decreto 185/VI, 9 Dezembro 1994) which was partially declared unconstitutional (Acordão 
59/95, 16 Fevereiro 1995). The politicisation reached between the Social Democrat majority 
and opposition parties and the divided intervention of the TC to appreciate the 
constitutionality of proposals made, contributed little to reassure citizens of the willingness of 
the political class to improve standards of financial propriety in political life. 
 
On April 1995, a few months before the general elections, a new regime of “public control on 
the wealth of elective officials” was passed in parliament. The reform was perceived by the 
opposition and some leaders of opinion as a desperate pre-electoral effort by the declining 
PSD majority to restore its image before a discontented electorate. The Law 25/95 of 2 April 
1995 was part of a broader package of laws – Pacote Transparência17 – aimed at restoring 
citizens’ confidence in political institutions and promoting transparency in political life. The 
reform was made on three fronts: the revision of control provisions set under the Law 4/83; 
the introduction of a Register of Interests under the Statute of MPs; and the creation of a 
                                                                                                                                                         
16 Alto Comissário Contra a Corrupção - AACC, Relatório 1988-1989, II, Anexos, A.8.3.-A.8.23. 
17 The 1993 reform would be the starting point of a series of legislative interventions on matters relating to 
transparency and probity in political life. The reform introduced a new regime on incompatibilities (Lei 64/93), 
on party and electoral financing (Lei 72/93), on parliamentary inquiries (Lei 5/93), on the public access to 
administrative documents (Lei 65/93). It also revised the Statute for MPs (Lei 7/93) and introduced a new 
ordinance for Administrative and Auditing Courts (Lei 11/93). In 1994, parliament passed a new an anti-
corruption law (Lei 36/94) aimed primarily at increasing the Judiciary Police’s investigative powers, but whose 
legal provisions had to be slightly reformulated. The reform would resume in 1995 with the constitution of a 
parliamentary commission on ethics and transparency in public life (Res. AR 27/95) and the adoption of a 
package of laws replacing previous regimes. The so-called Pacote de Transparência included: Law 24/95, 
revising the Statute of MPs; Law 25/95, revising control on the wealth, patrimony and interests of elective 
officials; Law 26/95, revising MPs’ wages; Law 27/95, revising party and elections financing; Law 28/95 
revising incompatibilities; Law 32/95, providing the government with legislative capacity to implement measures 
on money laundering and other goods derived from criminal activities. 
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permanent parliamentary commission on ethics.18 The Law 25/95 presented some positive 
changes: 
 
• rules of disclosure were extended to a series of appointed offices (art. 4.3); 
• the contents of patrimonial declarations were broadened to include the patrimony and 
wealth of politicians abroad and the social positions (e.g. directorships) they had held for 
the last two years or currently in exercise, in public or private foundations, associations 
other than public companies; 
• emphasis was also put on the need to regularly update declarations (art. 2), even if rules 
remained flexible to MPs. They were only required to update their declarations within two 
months after the end of their mandate or at the end of the legislature when substituted, but 
they could always claim that no updating was needed and hold to their first declaration 
(art. 2.4). In principle, the final declaration should reflect the patrimonial evolution 
incurred while in office (art. 2.5), in practice, however, there was no reinforcement of 
monitoring procedures to assess regularly the validity and evolution of contents. No 
adequate monitoring meant, consequently, no effective sanctioning; 
• in what concerns the selective public access to declarations introduced by 1983, the 
response of legislators was unsatisfactory. The principle of “free public access and 
scrutiny” of declarations (arts. 5.1 and 6.1) was only partially improved. Elective officials 
could oppose the publicity of the contents of their declarations when submitting these to 
the TC or whenever a member of the public requests access. The TC must appreciate the 
elective officials’ arguments for denying public access and decide whether the contents of 
patrimonial declarations could be publicised, totally or partially. If, under the Law 4/83, 
the TC denied almost without reservation access to declarations by members of the public, 
under the new regime, it was the elective official’s duty to justify “with a relevant 
motivation” why public access should be disallowed. 
 
The major innovation of the Law 25/95 was the introduction of a Register of Interests.19 Rules 
of disclosure moved away from the visible aspects of financial impropriety to address 
conflicts of interest by elective officials in light of the Westminster model. The Register of 
Interests for MPs and members of government is kept and controlled by parliament itself and 
is available for public consultation (though not yet published in the parliament’s website). All 
activities susceptible to the creation of a conflict of interest or an opportunity for financial 
impropriety must be registered. This should not be perceived as an ultimate condition to free 
elective officials from further obligations in declaring potential conflicts of interest when 
pursuing public business. In fact, art. 27 provides that MPs must declare their interests 
whenever taking part in parliamentary sessions or works. However, the extent of oral 
                                                 
18 This permanent commission had been previously set as an eventual commission by parliamentary resolution 
(Res. AR 27/95, 5 April) to study matters on ethics and transparency concerning the works of political 
institutions and elective officials. The works of this commission, which was due to report to parliament on May 
30, were insistently blocked by the Social Democrat majority represented. 
19 Art. 26, 27 and 28 of the 1995 Statute of MPs (Lei 24/95). 
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declaration is limited: it concerns only those interests that may lead to a direct advantage20 
being obtained from the law or parliamentary resolution under consideration. The provision 
could be interpreted as a cynical way to render ineffective an instrument which aimed to strike 
a balance between binding rules and self-regulation, between enforceable standards and the 
honour of MPs and parliament in dealing with instances of impropriety in office. If this is not 
a sufficient example of the deliberate attempt on the part of the political class to trivialise 
control over their pecuniary interests, it suffices to add that no penalties were provided for 
those MPs and members of government who failed to register or declare their interests during 
parliamentary sessions and works. 
 
The peculiarity of the present regime is that control over the wealth and patrimony of 
politicians – i.e. the visible aspect of impropriety and corruption – remains in the hands of an 
external judicial body, whereas conflicts of interest – i.e. the opportunity structures – are dealt 
with internally by the parliament’s new Ethics commission. This “dual-monitoring” system 
renders control confusing, not to say ineffective. This odd arrangement is not unique to the 
regime of disclosure of MPs’ assets and interests. For many years, the regime of political 
financing had also operated under two separate monitoring bodies responsible for assessing 
separately campaign and party annual accounts, as if elections were not the major source of 
expenditure of party life! 
 
The commission is not yet a credible instrument of control and the chances that such a body 
may gain some institutional relevance are few, given its in-house nature, party-based 
composition and inaccessibility by citizens at large. The remote likelihood that a few 
members of the house start a witch hunting procession against those who fail to register 
properly their interests would probably decree the commission’s extinction by vote of 
parliament, as it happened with the High Authority Against Corruption in 1992. 
 
 
                                                 
20 Pecuniary benefit obtained directly by the MP or in favour of his/her companion/spouse and close family 
members. 
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4. The pitfall of legalistic approaches to public-private conflicts of interest in 
parliament: impeding the excess and institutionalizing the orthodoxy 
 
Another mode of addressing conflicts of interest in parliament is by placing limitations on 
private jobs and activities. The significance of this measure, however, varies across countries. 
The moral costs have been heavier or softer depending on traditions of interest representation 
and regulation in national parliaments and the prevailing culture of conflicts of interest in a 
given political society. 
 
Portugal has always preferred a legalistic and restrictive approach to the problem of elective-
private conflicts of interest in parliament. The legislative response has been paradigmatic: it 
allows accumulation while regulating in an incremental and reactive fashion those instances 
that have caused public concern. 
 
There is nothing more appropriate than Tommasi di Lampedusa’s historical scepticism, 
“changing everything, so that nothing really changes”, 21 to understand the consecutive waves 
of reforms to the Statute of MPs in Portugal. Eight legislative interventions22 in less than two 
decades and MPs were still unable to create an appropriate ethical framework to prevent 
conflicts of interest deriving from the accumulation of the parliamentary mandate with other 
outside jobs, appointments or even mandates. The legal provisions permitting these 
opportunity structures for conflicts of interest were left untouched from one intervention to 
another. 
 
The accumulation between the parliamentary mandate and private jobs and activities had been 
a common practice since the early days of the new democracy and was “guaranteed” as 
entitlement under the 1985 Statute of MPs. According to article 5(2)(b), MPs were entitled to 
advocate the “urgent exercise of a professional activity” as a legitimate ground to be 
temporarily substituted in parliament. MPs could return to their professional activities and 
outside jobs while in office, for a minimum of 15 days and a maximum of 2 years per 
legislature, without having to declare them. This regime, which was later reduced to a single 
                                                 
21 Filippo Tommasi di Lampedusa, Il gatto pardo, Torino, Feltrinelli, 1958. 
22 Lei 3/85 of 13 March 1985, Lei 98/89 of 29 December 1989, Lei 7/93 of 1 March 1993, Lei 24/95 of 18 August 
1995, Lei 55/98 of 18 August 1998, Lei 8/99 of 10 February 1999, Lei 45/99 of 16 June 1999 and Lei 3/2001 of 
23 February 2001. 
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period of 45 days for each legislative session, remained contrary to any effective control on 
public/private conflicts of interest in parliament. 
 
The 1989 reform to the Statute of MPs introduced, for the first time, impediments to private 
activities (art. 19-A), but the exercise was far from guaranteeing the impartiality and integrity 
of MPs. The impediments placed on MPs were few and their application was vague. MPs 
were prohibited from appearing or participating in any commercial publicity or advertisement 
by private entities (art. 19-A.1.e). But that did not preclude companies from continuously 
displaying well-known parliamentarians as members of their board of directors or as external 
advisors. MPs holding private jobs and activities were precluded from entering any public 
competition for the supply of goods and services to the State or any other collective public 
entity (art. 19-A.1.d). In practice, however, the impediment only applied to those companies 
in which MPs held visible positions, such as directorships or ownership, otherwise 
permissible if MPs held fictitious positions, exercised their rights as shareholders or even 
acted through an intermediary or family member. MPs were prohibited from taking part, as 
remunerated experts or referees, to any judicial process in which the State or any other public 
entity are parties (art. 19-A.1.b). But there were no impediments placed on membership in law, 
consulting or lobbying firms. In fact, a large number of MPs were members of the major law 
firms in Portugal, most of which were often requested to write expert opinions on certain 
regulatory legislation. The court cases these prominent partners brought to the firm in 
question and that raised conflict with their parliamentary mandate were simply passed on to 
young apprentices in the office. Adding to its vagueness, the impediment could always be 
lifted through parliamentary deliberation in cases of alleged “public interest” (art. 19-A.2). 
This mechanism meant the trivialisation of any serious attempt to deal with growing 
opportunity structures for corruption and influence trafficking at the parliamentary level that 
emerged with the proliferation of parliamentary commissions on regulation. A new article 19-
B was also introduced making it compulsory for MPs to deposit with the Bureau of the 
Attorney-General (Procuradoria-Geral da República) a declaration of honour confirming the 
non-existence of any incompatibility or impediment. The declaration of non-incompatibility 
was a mere formality, liberating MPs from future checks (which were also unlikely to take 
place), since the regime of temporary substitution for the “urgent exercise of a professional 
activity” continued to guarantee public/private conflicts of interest entering parliament. 
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The political class showed great unease to proceed with the necessary reforms. In 1993, when 
the then president of the Lawyers’ Association, Júlio de Castro Caldas demanded a complete 
ban on accumulation between the parliamentary mandate and the exercise of advocacy, the 
call for reform immediately triggered the outcry of 38 lawyer-MPs who threatened to vote 
against this project.23 While those pressing for a ban claimed that the reform would dignify 
the parliamentary mandate – an MP cannot serve both gods, the public and their clients’ 
interests – the vast majority of MPs interpreted such an impediment as discriminatory and 
conducive to an undesirable professional political class. Lawyer-MPs argued, not surprisingly, 
that the problem of influence trafficking deriving from illicit political lobbying concerned 
diverse protagonists of whom they were the least suspected. This attitude was a reflection of 
the prevailing negative environment towards impediments to outside professional activities. 
Certainly, the problem of influence trafficking at the parliamentary level was not restricted to 
this class of MPs, but what seemed worrying was the overall unwillingness to preclude MPs 
from holding lobbying and consulting activities. 
 
The reform of 1989, which finally led to the publication of a new and complete version of the 
Statute of MPs in 1993, showed a tendency to emulate the Westminster model with regard to 
the regulation of public/private conflicts of interest in parliament. Disclosure was preferred to 
setting legal constraints. There were several arguments for impediments to be restricted to 
specific situations of conflict which arose when MPs acted on both sides of the fence. First, 
MPs believed impediments to private-sector employment were an assault on their 
parliamentary entitlements. MPs believed they were able to self-impose ethical standards 
regulating their conduct vis-à-vis business influence, and that the introduction of legal 
impediments was a dispensable practice (especially if dismissal from office was introduced as 
a sanction!). Moreover, there was a general feeling that the creation of “career politicians” 
was undesirable. However, contrary to the British case, where “the courts of public opinion” 
act to impose standards on MPs, thus ensuring that the system of self-regulation and 
disclosure of interests works with very few drawbacks, in Portugal, public opinion and in 
particular the media play no role in the monitoring of conflicts of interest in parliament. In this 
context, setting or reviewing impediments becomes essentially a cosmetic and “corporate” 
initiative by members of parliament. The few impediments placed on MPs contrast greatly 
with an ethical environment where little or no distinction is made between public and private 
                                                 
23 ‘Deputados não querem deixar advocacia’, Expresso, 9 Janeiro 1993, [Política], p. A2. 
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interests. Instead of self-regulation, the reforms of 1989 and 1993 to the Statute of MPs on 
matters of impediments created a normative context of non-intrusion and non-interference 
with parliamentary privilege. 
 
By the mid-1990s, the Socialist Party presented two projects of law reforming 
incompatibilities to politicians, senior public officials and MPs.24 The project of Law 498/VI 
was mainly designed to prohibit lobbying and consulting activities, which had become a way 
of life in parliament. The Commission on Constitutional Matters approved, in principle, the 
two proposals for reform with a unanimous vote. One month later, the Social Democrat 
majority rejected both proposals just before the general elections of October 1995, which 
would bring to an end its 10-year rule. While the problem of advocacy and lobbying had been 
a source of public concern and an important issue of parliamentary reform in Britain, in 
Portugal it was met with the indifference of public opinion and the complacency of its 
political class. Impediments to outside jobs and activities have recently been reviewed and 
extended in the light of these earlier proposals. The new article 21 of the 1999 Statute of MPs 
regulated the exception, while the orthodoxy became institutionalised. Notwithstanding the 
“good will “ of legislators, the fallacy of the legalistic approach to conflicts of interest 
prevailed: the more detailed impediments to MPs are, the likelier that their applicability and 
monitoring will be at odds. 
 
MPs were precluded from entering, directly as single or collective interested parties or 
indirectly as shareholders or acting through an intermediary or family member, any public 
tendering or contract with any public or semi-public institution (arts. 21.3.a, 21-A and 21.3.d). 
They were equally precluded from providing political consulting or assistance to private 
entities “whose interests are opposed to those of the State or any public entity” (art. 21.3.b). 
However, the measure addressed some of the symptoms, but not the cause of the mingling of 
public/private interests in parliament, i.e. job accumulation. MPs were still allowed to hold 
jobs or be members of lawyer, consulting and lobbying firms. 
 
Sanctions were also stiffened (art. 21.4) – those MPs found in a position of impediment would 
immediately lose their mandate – but enforcement remained uncertain. It is the Ethics 
                                                 
24 Projecto de Lei 462/VI, Alteração da Lei 64/93, de 26 de Agosto (Regime de incompatibilidade de titulares de 
cargos políticos e altos cargos públicos), D.A.R., II Serie-A, No. 6, 18 Novembro 1994; Projecto de Lei 498/VI, 
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Commission responsibility to investigate the truthfulness of an alleged situation of 
impediment by one of its members, but the likelihood of finding cooperative endeavours 
amongst MPs in this domain is still meagre. MPs have more to gain from their collegial 
backslapping and silence about each other’s interests than from being the accuser, policeman, 
judge or jury in an in-house inquisitory framework. 
 
 
 
5. General features of conflicts of interest legislative reforms 
 
Today, placing legal constraints on the accumulation of outside jobs, mandates or functions by 
MPs other than addressing material dysfunctions to the system of representation – e.g. 
parliamentary absenteeism – constitutes an important pillar of ethics reform. Guidance, 
deontology and disclosure are fundamental, but insufficient. Incompatibility rules to MPs 
represent a step forward towards the reinforcement of preventive mechanisms against 
corruption. Although countries tackled this sort of accumulation in very different ways, and 
not all have opted for setting legal constraints to outside jobs and activities, there are some 
general trends of conflicts of interest reforms that should not go overlooked: 
 
• the reactive and circumstantial nature of reform - More often than not, setting new 
incompatibilities to MPs has always came late in the day as a reaction to excess 
accumulation and/or specific scandals rather than a comprehensive and proactive attitude 
towards conflicts of interest in parliament. New incompatibilities have been introduced 
and monitoring procedures have been strengthened, but the drives for political reform 
have been product of successive crises-reactions to deep-seated practices which gradually 
proved to be or were perceived as threats to the quality of democracy; 
 
• the selective application of incompatibilities and the institutionalisation of situations of 
conflict – There is a tendency to address by law what individual and collective 
(parliamentary) ethics are unable to prevent. For that reason, the scope of application of 
incompatibilities remains strictly formal and denominative. The parameters used and 
revised have been deliberately selective, addressing some instances of conflict while 
leaving others unregulated. Incompatibility rules tend to regulate the exception and MPs 
have always been keen to explore that regulatory deficiency - whatever is not proscribed 
by law becomes acceptable according to their own mores. In other words, entitlement 
comes before self-restraint. MPs do not abdicate the accumulation with other mandates, 
functions, jobs or activities unless expressly told to do so by law. This legal minimalism 
has often made parliaments overlook certain conflicts of interest; 
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• the symbolic nature of reform and the trivialisation of control – Where certain conflicts of 
interest have gradually become unacceptable to public opinion, political elites have 
reacted to address public concern, but the reforms introduced were often cosmetic, that is, 
deprived of clear norms and adequate instruments to ensure their effective application and 
enforcement. MPs have always avoided stringent impediments to their accumulative 
functions, outside jobs and interests; 
 
• the “tailor made” nature of conflicts of interest regulation - Similar to party financing 
regulation, conflict of interest regulation is designed, adopted and implemented by the 
very same political actors whose conduct they aim to regulate. This explains the slow pace 
and limited scope of reforms and the low profile kept by both the ruling party and 
opposition during the discussion and adoption of these legal diplomas. Parliaments never 
seem to find the right occasion to move on with the necessary reforms and have often 
reacted as “corporate” guardians of their members’ privileges and interests during 
tentative reforms. Changes to the regime of incompatibilities affect all MPs, regardless of 
their partisan allegiance, thus requiring dialogue and accommodation between all major 
parties in parliament; 
 
• the difficulty of enforcing standards of financial probity to MPs in a continuum - MPs, 
unlike public officials, are temporary office holders, in the sense that their permanence in 
power is dependent upon (re)election. For that reason, it is difficult to address, through 
incompatibility rules, conflicts of interest in a continuum, i.e. prior, during and following 
the holding of office and to make present MPs and future candidates accept and guide 
their conduct by the principles of objectivity and honesty imposed by these regimes. 
Incompatibility rules address only those situations of conflict which threaten the probity of 
MPs while in office. In most cases, however, the parliamentary mandate might have ended 
by the time a conflict of interest is ascertained and this poses considerable problems to 
create a lasting institutional culture against conflicts of interest. Whereas rules on 
employment after leaving public office25 have been introduced to civil servants and, to a 
much lesser extent, ministers and government officials, there is no such conflicts of 
interest clearance applicable to MPs. 
 
 
5.1. Next steps 
 
Academics are often more comfortable at indicating what went wrong with a particular reform 
than at providing alternative or feasible solutions. Some of the recommendations, which I am 
about to enumerate, are know to legislators, but it is useful to recall them: 
 
• General risk assessment: not all areas of legislative and parliamentary work offer the 
same windows of opportunity for financial impropriety. The work of the constitutional 
commission raises lesser incentives to profiteering than the issuing of regulations to 
various business sectors and scientific innovations or the approval of a privatisation 
                                                 
25 For a period of time after leaving office, civil servants and, to a much lesser extent, ministers and government 
officials are often impeded from entering contractual agreements with or accepting jobs in those business sectors 
for which they have regulated or overseen ex officio. 
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bill. Before engaging in a legislative reform, legislators should have a comprehensive 
assessment of the problems and values at stake; 
 
• Solid and open reforms: preference for single and comprehensive reforms, instead of 
incessant incremental reforms. Greater openness, for instance through public hearings 
of the various discussions preceding the adoption/revision of conflicts of interest 
regulation to enable an input from nonpolitical experts (such as public officials, 
magistrates, academics, and journalists); 
 
• The regulation should address conflicts of interest comprehensively and in a 
continuum: the regime of disclosure should cover both actual and potential conflicts of 
interest, by introducing an open clause for all those situations which are not specified 
under the provisions, but that are likely to be met with public or collegial disapproval 
once unveiled. Conflicts of interest should also be assessed and sanctioned in a 
continuum: in order to enter office (screening), while in office (monitoring) and after 
leaving office (clearance); 
 
• Transparency of regulatory procedures: ensuring the publication and public access to 
registers of interests and asset declarations (for instance, by making them available in 
the Internet). Holding public hearings for disciplinary proceedings; 
 
• Setting a complaints system: public opinion plays an important role in ensuring that 
standards of conduct and conflicts of interest rules are respected and procedures are 
followed with the ultimate consequences to wrongdoers. Public opinion also plays a 
central role in bringing situations of conflict to the attention of monitoring bodies 
(whose oversight is always limited). Experts and watchdog NGOs can raise new issues 
of concern to the monitoring body, upon which it can issue recommendations to the 
appropriate legislative committee in view of a future revision of the regulatory 
framework; 
 
• Swift response and disciplinary action: the timing of response between monitoring and 
enforcement is crucial to a sound regulatory framework. The regulatory body should 
be able to come to a fast resolution upon the allegation or evidence of conflict of 
interest; fast and effective sanctioning brings credibility to the control regime. Good 
results increase support for the monitoring institutions and need to be communicated 
to the public at large. 
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